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The Origins of the Anglo-American Research
Alliance and the Incidence of Civilian Neuroses
in Second World War Britain
STEPHEN T CASPER*
Introduction
From August 1940 until May 1941, Germany subjected Great Britain to air bombard-
mentsbynightandday.DesmondFlowerrecalledhowLondonshookasthefirstbombshit
the docks, while in early September 1940, nurse Frances Faviell described London’s
casualties as, ‘‘bodies, limbs, blood and flesh mingled with little hats, coats, and
shoes’’.
1 Despite this onslaught and the ‘‘‘Blind savagery’’ of night attacks’, The Times
described a courageous dignity among the citizenry.
2 Continuing this pattern in his private
correspondence, the Edinburgh psychiatrist David Kennedy Henderson would write in the
New Year to his American colleague, Adolf Meyer, that:
In such times as these the potential neurotic or psychotic pulls himself together a bit, he wants to
put on a face as good and as great as any other man, he rises to the occasion and in consequence
consultation work and admission to hospital are rather less than in ordinary times.
3
Such public and private sentiments were commonplace and echoed the personal, societal,
and political need to appear courageous, as well as controlled, unified, and unwavering in
morale.
4 In various ways, it was a language of reassurance: one that comforted the British
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327population at home while also heightening the confidence of her allies abroad that Britain
would carry on. This rhetoric of fortitude was becoming one of the lifelines of Britain’s
national sovereignty.
5
Scholars often discount the effects of such rhetoric on the production of science and
the practice of medicine, yet such rhetoric is significant, especially when explored from
outside the more traditional perspective of national history.
6 This paper does that by
emphasizing the connected context of biomedical science in Britain and North America
during the early years of the Second World War. At the time of the blitz, physicians and
scientists on both sides of the Atlantic began developing informal structures and institu-
tions to support a transnational biomedical research collaboration for the combined
defence of Anglo-America.
7 As this biomedical collaboration formalized slowly within
institutions and government directives, relations at times became problematic.
8 One area
where differences arose concerned questions about the causes and incidence of civilian
neuroses in Britain. Were air raids, for instance, causing increases? The rhetoric of the
times suggested they were not, but was that merely the consequence of social policy? In
Britain by 1940, physicians, cradled in the experience of treating patients with neuroses
during the First World War, and now acting as advisers to the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Pensions, had crafted ‘‘a double-barrelled approach’’ to mental illness. This,
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acts, cash must be paid.’’ Alzada Comstock,
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Canada’, Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci., 1941, 214:
111–17, p. 116.
8The most detailed study of the organization of
science in America for this period remains Daniel J
Kevles, The physicists: the history of a scientific
community in modern America, Cambridge, MA,
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Stephen T Casperaccording to Ben Shephard, treated real neurotics while discouraging civilian and military
cases of war neuroses by suppressing ‘‘all mention of quasi-medical terms like ‘shell-
shock’’’, denying pensions for such cases, and making it ‘‘impossible for ‘neurosis’ to be
used as grounds for getting discharged from the Army’’.
9 These policies, however, were
not well understood by civilian scientists and physicians in the United States, who alleged
that their collaborators were under-reporting the direct effects of the bombing on the
civilian population. These differences exacted a toll by politicizing the transnational
collaboration’s aims, methods, and even its scientific conclusions.
Nevertheless, the origins of this Anglo-American biomedical research alliance lay in a
realm of assumed shared values, while the tensions of that assumption became inextricable
from the joint endeavour in cooperation. The international context of the question of
civilian neuroses in Britain, therefore, provides a site from which we can survey the
resulting political tensions between government agencies and friends alike. This paper
uses the case of this transnational collaboration to examine the limits of scientific objec-
tivity in wartime Britain, while also calling attention to the ways this alliance helped to
foster the transformation from the informal world of inter-war biomedicine to the struc-
tured government science found in Britain and North America in the post-war period.
10
The Origins and Political Context of the Trans-Atlantic Research Alliance
In the summer of 1940, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created a committee in the
United States devoted to the organization of scientific research for the national defence.
11
He empowered the National Defence Research Committee (NDRC) with the executive
authority,funds,andremit‘‘tocorrelateandsupportscientificresearchonmechanismsand
devices of warfare’’.
12 In mid-1941 the Chairman of that Committee, Vannevar Bush, was
asked byRoosevelt toinvitethe Britishgovernment‘‘tosenda missiontothe United States
to consider ways and means of sharing scientific and technical information between the
United States Services and the NDRC ...and the British Services and scientific organiza-
tions’’.
13 Research science, thus described, became part of a joint effort for the combined
9The effect, Ben Shephard argues, was the
unsurprising reduction of cases of neurosis and the
feelingamongsomepsychiatriststhattheywerebeing
strait-jacketedbythesystem.BenShephard,‘‘‘Pitiless
psychology’’:theroleofpreventioninBritishmilitary
psychiatry in the Second World War’, Hist.
Psychiatry, 1999, 10 (40): 491–524, pp. 522–3.
10I thank one of my anonymous reviewers for
helping me to see how this point could be more
strongly developed. This paper does not seek to
address the status of the medical literature on the
subject of civilian neuroses throughout the 1930s and
1940s. Instead, it aims to place the first report on the
incidence of neurosis in its proper context—this
transnational collaboration—and to show ways that
the report’s content paralleled public and private
discourse.
11James Phinney Baxter, Scientists against time,
Boston, MIT Press, 1946, p. 15; Bernard Katz,
‘Archibald Vivian Hill, 26 September 1886–3 June
1977’, Biog. Mem. Fellows R. Soc., 1978, 24:
pp. 115–19.
12Archibald Hill, ‘Science and defence.
Anglo-American partnership in research. Speed in
communication the key to success’, The Times,
17 June 1941, p. 5; see also Joseph Hinsey, ‘Herbert
Gasser’, in Webb Haymaker and Francis Schiller
(eds), The founders of neurology: one hundred and
forty-six biographical sketches, Springfield, IL,
Charles Thomas, 1970, p. 215.
13Hill,op.cit.,note12above,p.5;seealsoStanley
Goldberg, ‘Inventing a climate of opinion: Vannevar
Bush and the decision to build the bomb’, in Numbers
and Rosenberg (eds), op. cit., note 8 above, p. 277.
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The Origins of the Anglo-American Research AlliancedefenceofAnglo-America.Thisrelationship,however,hadalreadyexistedunofficiallyfor
more than a year in the biomedical sciences.
14
Multiple precedents for combined defence research had existed since the First World
War.
15 During the 1914–18 conflict, the American National Academy of Sciences created
the National Research Council (NRC), which had cooperated with the newly formed
BritishMedical ResearchCommittee.
16Bothagencieshadcollaboratedintheorganization
of the medical services and research. In addition, they had jointly published a Medical
Bulletin focusing on the health problems of war, and brought research workers in the two
nations together with the hope of preserving ‘‘common ties between American and British
science’’.
17 At the onset of the Second World War, both bodies still existed, although
the Medical Research Committee had been renamed the Medical Research Council (MRC)
and by then had achieved far greater authority in dictating national science policy than
its American counterpart, which remained a private agency closely affiliated with
government bodies.
In Second World War America, however, the primary role of the new NDRC differed
substantiallyfromthatoftheolderNRC,inthatitsmajoremphasiswasonappliedresearch
in physics and chemistry.
18 The result of this difference was that between 1940 and the
summer of 1941, biomedical collaborations like those that had existed between Britain and
the United States during the First World War were excluded by Roosevelt’s executive
remittotheNDRC.
19Thissituationwascorrectedfinallyinsummer1941,whenRoosevelt
replaced that government committee with the Office of Scientific and Research Devel-
opment (OSRD).
20 Shortlythereafterthe OSRD CommitteeonMedical Research—known
14For related examples, see Wellcome Library,
ArchivesandSpecialCollections(hereafterWL),GC/
135/B/1 Box 2, Service Psychiatry Monographs, 49,
Ladislas Farago, ‘German psychological warfare:
survey and bibliography’, New York, 1941, pp. 44–5,
50–2.
15Saul Benison, A Clifford Barger, and Elin L
Wolfe, ‘Walter B Cannon and the mystery of
shock: a study of Anglo-American co-operation in
World War I’, Med. Hist., 1991, 35: 217–49; Daniel
J Kevles, ‘‘‘Into hostile political camps’’: the
reorganization of international science in World
War I’, Isis, 1971, 62: 47–60; Brigitte Schroeder-
Gudehus, ‘Challenge to transnational loyalties:
international scientific organizations after the First
World War’, Sci. Stud., 1973, 3: 93–118; Wilder
Penfield, The difficult art of giving: the epic of Alan
Gregg, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967; For a broader
account, see Daniel T Rodgers, Atlantic crossings:
social politics in a progressive age, Cambridge,
MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1998.
16The major history of the Medical Research
Council remains A Landsborough Thomson, Half a
century of medical research, 2 vols, London, HMSO,
1973–5, pages 292–332 of vol. 2, are the most
relevantforthisstudy.JoanAustoker,‘WalterMorley
Fletcherandtheoriginsofabasicbiomedicalresearch
policy’, in Joan Austoker and Linda Bryder (eds),
HistoricalperspectivesontheroleoftheMRC:essays
in the history of the Medical Research Council of the
United Kingdom and its predecessor, the Medical
Research Committee, 1913–1953, Oxford University
Press, 1989, pp. 23–33.
17Walter Morley Fletcher, ‘The national
organization of medical research in peace after war’,
in Contributions to medical and biological research
dedicated to Sir William Osler ...in honour of his
seventieth birthday ...by his pupils and co-workers,
2 vols, New York, Paul Hoeber, 1919, vol. 1, p. 462;
The only study that I know exploring the origins of
the National Research Council is Nathan Reingold,
‘The case of the disappearing laboratory’, Am. Q.,
1977, 29: 79–101.
18Harry M Marks, The progress of experiment:
science and therapeutic reform in the United States,
1900–1990, Cambridge University Press, 1997,
pp. 98–100; Richard Rhodes, The making of the
atomic bomb, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1986;
‘Dr Vannevar Bush, development of atomic bomb’,
The Times, 1 July 1974, p. 16.
19Alan Gregg Diary, Reel 3, Friday, February 14,
1941, p. 16. Rockefeller Foundation Archives,
Rockefeller Archive Centre, Sleepy Hollow, New
York (hereafter, RAC).
20National Archives, Kew (hereafter NA), FD
1/6580, Executive order: Establishing the Office
of Scientific and Research Development in the
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Stephen T Casperusually by its acronym CMR—was formed and it incorporated the NRC transnational
liaison into its full, officially mandated remit.
21 Unofficial collaborations between bio-
medical scientists in both countries had nevertheless been established from autumn 1940.
In early September 1940, the Director of Johns Hopkins Medical School, then also
Chairman of the Medical Sciences Division of the NRC, Lewis H Weed, unofficially
approached his counterpart in the MRC, Edward Mellanby about the possibility of a
biomedical research collaboration between the two countries.
22 For this task, Weed
enlisted John Fulton, an American physiologist and former Rhodes Scholar who had
worked at Oxford under Charles Sherrington during the interwar period.
23
Shortly after the blitz started, Fulton wrote to Mellanby explaining that he and Weed
thought collaboration between the respective national agencies might prove advanta-
geous; the ‘‘suggestion goes to you quite informally and unofficially, but I hope that a
more formal proposal may be drawn up in the near future’’.
24 Mellanby replied that he
favoured the proposal, but advised that the only way collaborations could be effective
would be for some figure from America to visit Britain. ‘‘I am quite sure ...that if you
yourself could come to England, all your many friends would give you a great reception’’
and it would help in devising ‘‘some method of bringing about closer liaison’’.
25
Fulton arrived in Britain on 16 October 1940.
26 By the time he departed, an informal
proposal for cooperation between the Anglo-American biomedical research agencies had
been written.
27 Both the MRC and NRC were to operate as central clearing-houses for
information. University and industrial laboratories engaged in scientific research in either
nation would communicate information to their respective sub-committees within each of
the national agencies. Those sub-committees, in turn, would pass recommendations and
conclusions to their chief administrators, who would then send transcripts of meeting
minutes and recommendations overseas by diplomatic courier to their counterparts.
In this way, information would be disseminated up and down the chains of command.
28
executive office of the President and defining its
functions and duties, 28 June 1941.
21Letter from Warren Weaver to Daniel O’Brien,
8 July 1941, folder 482, box 37, series 401, Record
Group (hereafter RG) 1.1, RAC.
22The impetus for this liaison seems to have
come from John Fulton. Lewis Weed (1886–1952)
is a neglected but interesting figure in American
history. See Repository guide to the personal
papers collections of Alan Mason Chesney Medical
Archives Johns Hopkins Institutions, the Lewis H
Weed Collection; www.medicalarchives.jhmi.edu/
sgml/weed.html (accessed 25 Jan. 2008). On
Mellanby, see ‘Sir Edward Mellanby, diet
andnutrition’,TheTimes,31Jan.1955,p.8;BSPlatt,
‘Mellanby, Sir Edward (1884–1955)’, Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford
University Press, 2004 (hereafter ODNB), vol. 37,
pp. 744–5.
23Philip Wilson, ‘Fulton, John Farquhar’, http://
www.anb.org/articles/12/12-00308.html; American
National Biography Online, Feb. 2000 (accessed 23
Sept. 2006).
24NA, FD 1/6578, America, Co-operation with
Research Problems 1 (hereafter FD 1/6578), letter
from JohnFultonto Edward Mellanby, 18 Sept. 1940.
25NA FD 1/6578,letter from Edward Mellanby to
John Fulton, 25 Sept. 1940.
26NA FD 1/6578,letter from Edward Mellanby to
Kenneth Franklin, 17 Oct. 1940.
27NA FD 1/6578, letter from John Fulton to
Edward Mellanby, 31 Oct. 1940; National Academy
ofSciences,WashingtonDC,USA,NationalResearch
Council, manuscript (hereafter NRC, MS): Allied
Cooperation1940–April1941,letterfromJohnFulton
to Lewis Weed, 11 Nov. 1940; NRC, MS: Allied
Cooperation 1940–April 1941, A memorandum on
exchanging information.
28OnedescriptionofFulton’stimeinBritaincame
to the Rockefeller Foundation from Hugh Cairns,
Nuffield Professor of Neurosurgery at Oxford. ‘‘John
Fulton is here and has been cramming in an enormous
amount of valuable liaison work into a short time. He
will be able to give you a well-balanced account of
things when he goes back to US next week. He has I
think seen a great deal of the Research work that is
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The Origins of the Anglo-American Research AllianceThis proposal garnered the highest Cabinet approval within the British government.
Maurice Hankey, former Secretary of the Admiralty turned Representative on Science
to Winston Churchill, gave the collaboration his blessing, provided it did not cause
‘‘embarrassment’’ to Roosevelt, who was then engaged in a fierce presidential election
and running on a neutral platform.
29
The most famous biomedical discovery this transnational inter-agency collaboration
yielded was penicillin.
30 In a 1944 letter to a journalist, Mellanby wrote, ‘‘The most
dramatic of the war medical discoveries associated with the Medical Research Council
is, of course, that of penicillin. Information on this substance was supplied to the Ameri-
cans at an early stage, but the discovery was essentially British.’’ He was sensitive to the
spirit in which that research had been conducted, cautioning the journalist, ‘‘I should
consider it harmful to the complete interchange that now holds between the two countries,
if claims of priority were specially stressed in the public press. At present the most
amicable relations exist and there is no doubt in the minds of the scientific men engaged
where particular discoveries have originated.’’
31
Yet penicillin was just one among many success stories of this collaboration. The
administrators, scientists, and physicians involved could have boasted of their successes
in creating better military technologies such as armour, helmets, and textiles for military
uniforms that were designed for specific environmental combat conditions.
32 Likewise,
joint studies on operations research, aviation medicine and physiology, blood trans-
fusions, chemotherapy, orthopaedic surgery, and nutrition studies had led to a series of
conclusions shaping policies for the provision of citizen safety and supplies to the fighting
forces.
33
One underlying assumption of this partnership was that the exchange of scientific
information between the two nations should be free from political tinkering—the goal
of both agencies was to disseminate information and coordinate research.
34 This was not,
for instance, a place for propaganda or censorship. Almost immediately, however, peculiar
political tensions emerged within the mechanics of this collaboration, especially when
physicians in the United States asked whether air raids were increasing the incidence of
goingonandhasareallygoodviewofthehandicapsof
a democracy at War, reduplications and overlapping
ofwork,etc.’’LetterfromHughCairnstoAlanGregg,
31 Oct. 1940, Maudsley Hospital Psychotherapy,
folder 257, box 19, series 401, RG 1.1, RAC.
29AMCMA, Fulton Diary, 14 Oct. 1940, p. 39,
Fulton, John (Diaries) Oct. 1940–Aug. 1949, Lewis
Weed Papers, Correspondence, The Lewis H Weed
Collection.
30On penicillin, see Robert Bud, Pencillin:
triumph and tragedy, Oxford University Press, 2007,
pp. 23–87; Virginia Berridge, Health and society in
Britainsince1939,CambridgeUniversityPress,1999,
pp. 18–22.
31NA FD 1/6579, letter from Edward Mellanbyto
G E Brown, 7 Jan. 1944.
32Letter from Daniel O’Brien to Alan Gregg,
8 May 1941, folder 271, box 26, series 401,
RG 1.1, RAC.
33NRC, MS: Allied Cooperation 1940–April
1941; Distribution of NRC Reports, Minutes, etc;
letter from Edward Carmichael to Daniel O’Brien, 10
March 1941, folder 271, box 26, series 401, RG 1.1,
RAC;seealsoMFortunandSSSchweber,‘Scientists
andthe legacyofWorldWar II:the caseofoperations
research’, Soc. Stud. Sci., 1992, 23: 595–613;
moreover, it can be added that much of this work was
facilitated informally by the Rockefeller Foundation
as well as the NRC. ‘‘It is hard to write to friends in
trouble without a sense of guilt and a discomforting
feeling of being privileged and unfairly favoured. If
letters alone could help, I would have written many
longsince.Pleasekeepaneyeopenforwhatwemight
do to help and tell O’Brien.’’ Letter from Alan Gregg
to Edward Mellanby, 11 March 1941, folder 647, box
60, series 401E, RG 1.1, RAC.
34NRC, MS: Allied Cooperation 1940–April
1941, A memorandum on exchanging information.
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Stephen T Caspercivilian neuroses in the British population.
35 For the British, the question was loaded with
national security implications, and the miasma of patriotic sentiment began to cloud
the exchanges.
The Question of Civilian Neuroses in Britain
Recent scholarship has argued convincingly that debates in Britain that linked the
incidence of civilian neuroses with air raids and declining civilian morale diminished
throughout the course of the war, especially as the threat of a German invasion subsided.
36
Yet questions about the incidence of neuroses in Britain, as well the relationship between
psychiatric illness and civilian morale, still had political salience in 1940 and early 1941.
37
Though the incidence of civilian neuroses was foremost a domestic medical problem,
reported increases of such cases would have created a distressing picture of Britain’s long-
termprospects,toalliesandenemiesalike.
38Thediscoveryofincreasingmentalinstability
within the civil population would have implied diminishing morale and faltering resolve,
and this could have been exploited in enemy propaganda. In the context of this research
alliance, the implications of an increase in the incidence of civilian neuroses threatened a
carefully assembled network of commitments and friendships, sustained, in part, by the
belief that the British would carry on.
39
Contrary to numerous pre-war forecasts projecting enormous civilian psychiatric
casualties resulting from the aerial bombardments of metropolitan centres, an article
published in February 1941 in The Times reported that the British Ministry of Health
had found air raids were having no noteworthy psychological effect on the civilian popu-
lation.
40 In fact, the number of cases of shock had decreased by a factor of two since the
onset of the raids in September 1940. Sir Wilson Jameson, the Chief Medical Officer of
the Ministry of Health, reported that shock ‘‘instead of ...becoming an increasing dis-
ability ...had actually become a decreasing disability’’.
41 As will become clear, this was
not a view universally shared.
35The question of air raids and civilian neuroses
had been raised as early as 1939. See ‘Treatment of
neuroses in air-raids’, Lancet, 1939, ii: 1344–5. The
literature on neuroses is enormous, but for my
purposes the discussion in Ben Shephard, A war of
nerves: soldiers and psychiatrists, 1914–1994,
London, Pimlico, 2002, is adequate, especially
pp. 169–86 and 279–97.
36The most important recent consideration of the
subject, which contains a useful survey of the content
and status of the contemporary medical literature,
appearsinEdgarJones,RobinWoolven,BillDurodie ´,
and Simon Wessely, ‘Civilian morale during the
Second World War: responses to air raids re-
examined’, Soc. Hist. Med., 2004, 17: 463–79; Adam
Phillips, ‘Bombs away’, Hist. Workshop J., 1998,
pp. 196–7; Ben Shephard op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 514–20.
37Erick Wittkower and J P Spillane, ‘A survey of
the literature of neuroses in war’, in Emanuel Miller
(ed.), The neuroses in war, New York, Macmillan,
1945,pp.1–32,onpp.2–4;EdgarJones,‘Warandthe
practice of psychotherapy: the UK experience
1939–1960’, Med. Hist., 2004, 48: 493–510.
38Jones, et al., op. cit., note 36 above p. 479.
39Reports of the decline in neuroses were already
in circulation by November 1940. John Fulton, for
example, upon his return from England, reported to
AlanGreggthatthe‘‘neurosesdevelopedatthetimeof
Dunkirk are clearing up and that there are relatively
fewneurosesamongthecivilians’’.AlanGreggDiary,
Reel 3, Friday, November 9, 1940, p. 146. Such
statements and observations should be considered in
light of the broader context of the British propaganda
campaign against the United States. Philip M Taylor,
‘‘‘If war should come’’: preparing the fifth arm for
total war, 1935–1939’, J. Contemp. Hist., 1981, 16:
27–51;NicholasCull,‘Overturetoanalliance:British
propaganda at the New York World’s Fair,
1939–1940’, J. Br. Stud., 1997, 36: 325–54.
40Jones, et al., op. cit., note 36 above pp. 463–74.
41‘Airraids’effectonhealth.Casesofshockfewer
thanexpected’,TheTimes,19Feb.1941,p.2;seealso
Ministry of Pensions, Neuroses in war-time:
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The Origins of the Anglo-American Research AllianceThat same February, Daniel O’Brien, the Rockefeller Foundation’s European authority
on medical science, returned to Britain from a visit to the United States and hand-delivered
the first package containing correspondence and minutes relating to the biomedical
collaboration.
42 It apparently contained various minutes and recommendations for British
researchers from the NRC’s committees, but all that remains now is an index of the
packet’scontents and an extract from the NRC sub-committee on war neuroses. The index
reveals that the packet contained information and recommendations from sub-committees
on venereal, tropical, infectious, and cardiovascular diseases. There was also information
on blood transfusions, tuberculosis, medical nutrition, anaesthesia, and urology. Finally,
there were the proceedings from an NRC Committee on Neuropsychiatry, which was
broken into three sub-committees: Psychiatry, Neurology and War Neuroses.
43
A great deal can be learned from this index about differences in the administrative
organization of neurology, psychiatry, and neuropsychiatry in Britain and America.
44 In
America,neuropsychiatry functioned asanumbrellacommittee,under which thespecialist
committees of psychiatry and neurology were collected. This created some professional
antagonism.
45 According to Jack Pressman, American neuropsychiatrists, many propo-
nents of Freudian-based therapy, had been politically organizing their medical services
throughout the inter-war period in order to gain substantial philanthropic resources and
government recognition, and to develop a lasting institutional presence in American
hospitals, asylums, and universities.
46 The Rockefeller Foundation, in particular, had
been pushing for similar developments for neuropsychiatry throughout the rest of the
memorandum for the information of the medical
profession,London,HMSO,1940,pp.1–7;EEKrapf,
‘War-time psychiatry in Britain’, Britannica, 1944,
31: 11–23, pp. 13–22; Tom Harrisson, ‘Obscure
nervous effects of air-raids’, Br. med. J., 1941, i:
573–4; Joanna Bourke, ‘Fear and anxiety: writing
about emotion in modern history’, Hist. Workshop J.,
2003,55:111–33,onpp.114,126–7,andfn.7.Bourke
cites an important Home Intelligence Report in her
excellent discussion of the place of emotions in
history,butmissesthecriticallinksbetweentheHome
Intelligence Reports and Home Guard Propaganda.
See David K Yelton, ‘British public opinion, the
Home Guard, and the defense of Great Britain
1940–1944’,J.mil.Hist.,1994,58:461–80,pp.462–4.
42Daniel O’Brien (1894–1958) was normally
based in the Paris office, which was closed and
relocated to Lisbon after the German occupation of
France. O’Brien, however, after a war-time tour
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and Victoria A Harden (eds), Mind, brain, body,
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Stephen T Casperworld, especially in London.
47 Such a social organization for neuropsychiatry was
almost wholly absent in Britain, where the organization of medical services for nervous
diseases was divided, usually between neurologists, psychiatrists, consultant physicians
andgeneralpractitioners.
48ThetensionsthatwoulddeveloparoundtheWarNeurosessub-
committee extract must, in part, be located within this context of professional conflicts and
differences in national priorities and variations in standards of practice on nervous and
mental diseases.
The extract in the packet sent to the Medical Research Council casts light on how the
Americans perceived civilian mental health circumstances in Britain:
There was a lengthy discussion about the possibility and desirability of sending an observer of
neuroses to England. Dr [Frank] Fremont-Smith said that in his opinion, based on first-hand
information, it would be inadvisable to send an observer, as such, because of the attitude of the
British in minimizing the problem. The chief available source of information at present is through
Dr Dawson of the U.S. Public Health Service, who is stationed in England and who will send
reports every week or so, especially dealing with civilian morale. The disadvantage of an official as
compared with a freelance observer was mentioned.
49
Frank Fremont-Smith was an influential figure in American psychology and psychiatry in
this period. A graduate of Harvard Medical School and influenced by Freudian theory, in
1936 Fremont-Smith had become Director of the Josiah Macy Foundation, a medical
philanthropy advocating the advancement of psychoanalysis and improvement in the
organization of psychiatric services in North America.
50 Since mid-September, he had
been agitating for an American psychiatric observer to be placed in Britain. Alan Gregg,
the Rockefeller Foundation’s Director of the Medical Sciences Division, had warned him,
however, that few in Britain would have much sympathy with the suggestion, because it
would ‘‘have a curious ring to persons at present in London’’ who ‘‘might be quite over-
whelmed with events crowding rather rapidly around them’’.
51
Clearly, members of the sub-committee on War Neuroses believed neuroses to be more
of a problem among British civilians and soldiers than was being admitted officially. Yet,
even as the Americans connected neuroses to morale, they identified three reasons for not
sending a special observer: the British seemed to minimize the problem, there was already
anofficialobserverinthecountry,andfinallytherewastheimplicitlypoliticalviewthatan
official observer would see a different picture than someone sent unofficially. O’Brien, for
47For example, see WL, GC/135/B/1 Box 2,
Service PsychiatryMonographs,Alan Gregg, ‘‘‘What
is psychiatry?’’ An address by Dr. Alan Gregg,
director of the medical services division of the
RockefellerFoundation,givenonDec.2
nd,1941tothe
TrusteesoftheFoundation’.Seealso folder19,box2,
series 906, RG 3, RAC.
48A history of the development of British
psychiatric clinics is in C P Blacker, Neurosis and the
mental health services, London and New York,
Humphrey Milford and Oxford University Press,
1946, pp. 14–15, 17–21 and 47. This report also
analyses the various groups handling cases of
neuroses.
49NA, FD 1/6580, Neurological Problems: Co-
operation with America, Extract of the National
Research Council in the United States, Division of
Medical sciences, 14 Jan. 1941.
50OnFremont-Smith,seeWhowaswho,volume6:
1974–1976, Suwanee, GA, Marquis, 1976, p. 148; for
more on the Macy Foundation, see Pressman, op. cit.,
note 46 above, p. 370; Abbott, op. cit., note 44 above,
pp. 304–8.
51AlanGreggDiary,Reel3,Thursday,September
26, 1940, p. 125, RAC.
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The Origins of the Anglo-American Research Allianceone, eventually corroborated these views in letters sent in May 1941 to Gregg but which he
asked to be forwarded to Fremont-Smith. In his covering letter O’Brien clarified the
situation:
Shortly after my arrival I had the opportunity of seeing Dr Wilson, formerly assistant at the
Tavistock Clinic under Rees, and later Gillespie. From conversations with both of these
psychiatrists it was evident that there were practically as many opinions about the psychiatric
situation due to the war, as there were observers, or schools of thought. In general, it was evident
that [John Rawlings] Rees, who is the psychiatric consultant for the Army, did not carry much
weight either with the services, or with the other psychiatric groups. [Robert Dick] Gillespie, too,
had not much of an influence, even though listed as a consultant to the Air Force. [David Kennedy]
Henderson was in Scotland, and generally more highly considered, but was not particularly active
or driving. The psycho-analysts like [Ernest] Jones and Anna Freud, and [Edward] Glover, and
other groups, were held either in relatively ill-repute, or carried no weight. The only man who had
influence, and who was widely accepted, and whose opinion was of importance, was [Charles]
Symonds, who is consultant for the Air Services, and is the man on whom Vice Air Marshal
Wittingham [sic] of the Air Force depends. Symonds is also, more or less, the spokesman for the
medical profession per se, and particularly for the group of organic neurologists.
52
O’Brien’s comments underscore the significant divergence between the two nations.
TheeliteBritishconsultants charged with the careofciviliansoftenpreferredtoemphasize
the lack of known organic causes in neuroses and, moreover, were ill-disposed to Freudian
theory and practice. By contrast, American psychiatrists, although mindful of somatic
causes, were often psychodynamic in their approaches and tended to advocate for early
intervention in the treatment of neuroses.
53
The Political Context of an Epidemiological Question
Once delivered, the packet containing the index and extract was sent to various
individuals. Information was disseminated down to the individual laboratories, hospitals,
and universities directly concerned, and information was sent back up from those bodies
to the Medical Research Council, which was acting as the clearing-house.
54 Mellanby
sent the minutes from the Neuropsychiatry Committee—which included the extract,
as well as the minutes of the committees on Neurology, Psychiatry, and War
Neuroses—to the Cambridge neurophysiologist and Nobel Laureate, Edgar Douglas
Adrian for review.
55
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Stephen T CasperAdrian wrote to Mellanby in early April 1941 offering his assessment that the docu-
ments were largely unimportant. He added, however:
one passage ...is very interesting. You may have seen at the top of the page, about the desirability
of sending an observer of neuroses to England. Dr Fremont-Smith said it would be inadvisable to
send an observer as such, because of the attitude of the British in minimizing the problem.
56
He then continued:
But are we ‘‘minimizing’’ the problem? From casual papers in the Lancet etc. one certainly gets the
impression there has been no great increase in neuroses (unless gastric ulcers count), but I know
that [Daniel] O’Brien was puzzled at the apparent complacency of our people and was going to
consult various groups about it.
57
Adrian perceived the minute as an allegation:
I don’t like the suggestion that we are minimising the problem, which means, I suppose, either that
we are not treating people who ought to be treated, or are treating them for organic ailments when
they are really functional, or are concealing numbers. If any of these things are happening or are in
danger of happening, I should have thought someone would have made a fuss about it.
58
MellanbyagreedwithAdrian’sassessmentofthesituation,andhewrotetoWeeddeclaring
that he had no knowledge of an increase in neuroses.
59 Whether Mellanby had asked other
people about this the record does not indicate, but the archives of the Medical Research
Council, typically detailed, show an absence of other correspondence, suggesting that
Adrian was his chief source on the issue. In his letter to Weed, Mellanby finished:
If our attitude is simply one of complacency and ignorance, I am sure that we should be glad to be
made to see the truth. What none of us wants is to be allowed to live in a fool’s paradise. Our
psychologists in England, as I expect in America, are always fairly vocal and, if there were any
great increase in war neuroses, I expect they would let us know about it pretty quickly.
60
If these reactions seem exaggerated, then it was because the American allegation was
insensitive to the potential political ramifications of the question. It not only presented the
possibility that civilians were not coping as well with the air raids as the triumphant
newspaper headlines suggested, it also trivialized the British medical community’s
response and painted it as either intentionally evasive or emotionally repressed. The
Americans were furthermore irritating the prevailing somaticist orientation of Britain’s
neurological, psychiatric and physiological traditions.
61 The British medical community
had often linked the causes of functional diseases with mitigating environmental factors
such as pecuniary reward.
62 Many consultants were, moreover, sceptical if not openly
56NA, FD 1/6580, letter from Edgar Adrian to
Edward Mellanby, 3 April 1941.
57Ibid.
58Ibid.
59NRC, MS: Allied Cooperation 1940–April
1941,letterfromEdwardMellanbytoLewisWeed,16
April 1941.
60Ibid.
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discourse, 1860–1920’, in Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra
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Beard to the First World War, Amsterdam and New
York, Rodopi, 2001, pp. 97–115, p. 107.
62Nikolas Rose, The psychological complex:
psychology, politics and society in England,
1869–1939,LondonandBoston,Routledge,& Kegan
Paul, 1985, pp. 146–219, esp. p. 210; Shephard,
op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 522–3.
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The Origins of the Anglo-American Research Alliancederisive of psychoanalysis. One British neurologist’s comment was archetypal of the
organic point of view:
There is, I admit, something rather attractive about a conception of an unconscious mind that acts
almost as a sort of ‘‘villain of the peace’’, or sinister power behind the tottering throne of reason that
makes us very ready to accept it. It offers to relieve us of a great deal of responsibility for some of
our erratic ways—it is a very convenient scapegoat. For this reason a cynic might say that if there
were not an unconscious mind it would be necessary to invent one.
63
Shortly after Mellanby replied to Weed, Adrian suggested that the MRC commission a
report examining the question—this was to be the first detailed study of civilian neuroses
in Britain since the onset of hostilities. Adrian wrote, ‘‘I have had a talk to Aubrey
Lewis, who tells me that he has fairly reliable data (from S.P.s, hospitals, etc.) about the
general incidence in the civil population—and that it is surprisingly low.’’ In another
indication of the importance of the international context, Adrian added in his letter that
Lewis was unimpressed by the American neurological and psychiatric observer based in
the country, because he was ‘‘addicted to psychoanalysis and lots of other enthu-
siasms’’.
64 Admitting that Lewis was known to be somaticist in his sympathies, Adrian
pointed out that anyone was preferable to the current adviser to the Ministry of Health,
Gordon Holmes, a fiery conservative neurologist renowned for his short temper with
psychiatric cases as well as his total disdain for Freudianism.
65 Adrian completed his
letter with the thought:
I believe it might be well worthwhile (for propaganda’s sake if for nothing else) for the MRC to ask
Lewis for a report which we could then send over to the States. Things like the suicide of Virginia
Woolf get into the news and may tend to create the impression that we are in a bad way from the
point of view of morale.
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Aubrey Lewis was a respected figure in American circles. An Australian of Jewish
descent, and a graduate in medicine from Adelaide University, Lewis had been a
Rockefeller Travelling Fellow to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital and Johns Hopkins
Medical School,beforesettlingattheMaudsleyHospital,whereby1941hewasdirector.
67
Lewis was known to be disposed to Emil Kraepelin’s model of mental illness.
68 This
perspective emphasized that psychiatric symptoms often revealed underlying somatic
63University College London Francis Walshe
Papers, MS ADD 301 fd. B3, Anon., ‘Mind: doctor or
patient?’ The Listener, 4 July 1934.
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Stephen T Casperaetiologies but were unrelated to hidden urges.
69 He articulated his views of proper
psychiatric treatment in a letter sent to Gregg in late November 1940:
We have ...started what is in effect a social experiment in treatment by arranging for a number of
experts to conduct regular twice weekly classes and discussion circles which supplement the daily
regime of occupational therapy, psycho-therapy, physical training etc., but are different from these
in that they are optional and are not explicitly related to health and treatment. The University ...
has provided a panel of lecturers and the subjects at present range through motorcar engineering,
history of architecture, European affairs, book-keeping, music, drawing, wireless and electricity,
French, period furniture and gardening. As you will recognise, the subjects are partly cultural and
partly applied techniques; the therapeutic and educational side of it seems likely to be of
considerable importance...Under the conditions that are prevailing, this and rehabilitation seem to
be the only aspects of actual treatment (as apart from prophylaxis) likely to develop in an original
way during the war (unless new chemical methods of treatment prove valuable in controlling
emotional happenings.) Otherwise, it seems a matter of applying the lessons and using the methods
of 1914–18 in the light of general psychiatric principles.
70
Lewis was thoroughly somatic in his convictions and practice, and emphasized education,
discipline and duty when treating patients suffering from functional neuroses. Adrian
would have sympathized with Lewis’s therapeutic perspective. In addition, he would
have known that Lewis was an adviser to the Ministry of Health and the War Office
and thus cognisant of the national security issues that surrounded concerns about increa-
ses in the incidence of neuroses.
On 8 May 1941, Mellanby wrote to Lewis, explaining that Adrian had recommended
him as capable of producing an authoritative statement. Urging Lewis to remain objective,
Mellanby added, ‘‘there is ...no reason why we should delude ourselves on the subject of
war neuroses, if such have increased in the country’’.
71 Lewis was delighted with the
proposal.
72 Yet, despite Mellanby’s assurance that there was little need for delusions, once
Adrian had used the word ‘‘propaganda’’, Lewis’s work became linked inextricably to the
political context. True, Lewis may have been unaware of Adrian’s views, or he may have
been determined to remain impartial and objective, but it is an unavoidable conclusion
that a broader set of political concerns and structures were now influencing the status
of the future report. A comment Adrian made when he learned that Lewis was drafting it
underscores this view: ‘‘I am glad Aubrey Lewis is sending a report on neuroses. There
are too many emotional people concerned in the treatment of neurotics that mutual
distrust is natural.’’
73 Doubtless, some of the emotional people were Britain’s American
research collaborators, yet the National Research Council’s reaction to the news that
Lewis was drafting the report was ambivalence.
74
69‘Sir Aubrey Lewis: leading psychiatrist of his
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The Origins of the Anglo-American Research AllianceThe First Report on Civilian Neuroses in Britain
Despite the enormous volume of literature on civilian neuroses in Britain, no historical
studyhaseversoughttoplaceLewis’sreportinitsnationalorinternationalcontext,andthe
historiography concerns itself more with the polemical question of whether there actually
were increases in neuroses (never defined). This is an interesting oversight given that this
report was the first lengthy treatment of the topic in the British medical press. Perhaps this
is because the report, which Lewis published with few modifications in the Lancet, is a
challenging, ambiguous document.
75 Although its introduction and conclusion are clear,
the internal presentation of data, the statistical analyses Lewis used, and his justifications
for his methodology are difficult to follow. As published in the Lancet, the report ran to
eleven pages, had thirteen figures, identified thirty-two individuals who had contributed
data and other information, and ended with twenty-two endnotes. The information given
about the origins of the report appeared as an oblique note at the bottom of the first page:
‘‘Report prepared at the request of the Medical Research Council’’.
76 There were no hints
oftheinternationalcontextinwhichitwasproducedorthattheMRCintendedittoappease
their biomedical collaborators in the United States.
77
Lewis began his study by explaining that it was impossible to tell if a mental dis-
turbance is ‘‘directly attributable to war conditions, and particularly to air-raids’’. Because
of this, he suggested it would be useful to see if there were more or fewer cases of neurosis
before the war. He proceeded initially, therefore, by comparing the number of known
neurotic patients and the statistics from 1937 (the last year Lewis argued it would be
reasonable to claim people were unaffected by war conditions) and 1941. Towards the
latter half of the report, however, Lewis became increasingly expository in tone. Although
his text remained analytical, it relied on empirical observations from physicians residing
in bombed areas, and there were fewer statistical comparisons. The final pages analysed
correlative changes in suicide, motor accidents, and alcohol abuse rates. By the time it
concluded, Lewis seemed less interested in his initial comparative study, and more
interested in whether the war was causing neuroses. This subtle shift from his original
question—are there more or fewer cases of neurosis since the war began?—was one that
changed the overall coherence of his entire report.
Beginning by identifying how alterations in policies could sometimes cause dramatic
changes to occur within individual institutions, he noted that the number of patients
admitted to special EMS Neuroses Units in the period between October 1940 and June
1941 was only 300, and added that 136 patients had been admitted in May and June 1941.
This, he insisted, was because of a ‘‘newly instituted policy whereby all persons receiving
aninjury allowance for‘shock’orsimilar neuroticreactions were requiredtoenterhospital
for an expert opinion on the cause of their illness, and for treatment’’. He added, ‘‘Many of
reflected the fact that the organization and role of the
physical and biomedical sciences was being
significantly changed in America at this time. The
OSRDwasformedlaterthatmonth.Seenote20above.
75Aubrey Lewis, ‘Incidence of neuroses in
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air-raid casualties’, Lancet, 1941, i: 686–91.
76Lewis, op. cit., note 75 above.
77There was also no mention that Whitehall had
been asked to approve publication and distribution of
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Jameson to Landsborough Thomson, 4 Sept. 1941.
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Stephen T Casperthe latest admissions represented cases of unnecessarily long-continued payments.’’
78 In
general, however, the numbers of people claiming benefits for shock were not numerous,
and it was possible, he admitted, that many with a case for claiming the benefit did not do
so, thereby escaping the attention of medical practitioners.
Because ‘‘neuroses attributable to war conditions might occur in others less dramatically
exposed to stress’’, Lewis opted to study the case records of one London general practitioner
to see if there were any change in the overall incidence of neuroses. The general practitioner,
Lewis found, had seen 970 patients in nine months in 1937. Between September 1940 and
May 1941, however, the number of patients decreased to 740. In both years, the number of
neurotic patients was between 240 and 250, in effect implying an increase in patients
manifesting mental symptoms during the war period. Lewis had suspected the increase
was due to there being more women patients during the war, but instead he found similar
gender proportions to 1937. ‘‘The rise, therefore, in the proportion of neurotic illness did not
depend on a change in the sex ratio.’’ This was an important observation because it establi-
shed that any increase in neuroses was not the product of worry about loved ones fighting
in the armed services. Lewis concluded this section, ‘‘it appears that there had been a slight
rise since the blitz in the amount of neuroses in the available population’’. That slight rise,
based conservatively on his data, amounted to an increase of 6 per cent in London.
Lewis then compared the demographics of the neurotic populations between the two
years. More than half in both years had ‘‘a straightforward neurosis and the remainder have
prominent neurotic symptoms masquerading as physical disease or due to physical dis-
ease’’. Twenty per cent of the patients had never been diagnosed with mental illness, while
74 per cent had been knowntosufferfrom neuroticillnesses, which had ‘‘been madeworse
bythewar’’.Asmanyastwo-thirdsofthepatientshadeitherdevelopedneuroticsymptoms
or seen such symptoms aggravated since the war began. But, he cautioned:
As to the part played by actual war stress, including air-raids, there was evidence that this was one
of the causes of the illness in three-quarters of the patients who were now having their first neurotic
attack; and that it was partly responsible in four-fifths of the patients who had a history of previous
neurotic trouble. Air-raids alone had played a causal part in an eighth of the previously neurosis-
free: and in a sixth of those with previous neurotic history.
79
By diverting his attention to whether the war was causing neurotic symptoms, Lewis was
ignoring his primary question regarding the increase or decrease in cases of neurosis. Even
on the question of whether the war could be causal, Lewis adopted a mixed position. He
argued that two-thirds of the patients being seen in hospitals and clinics would have been
admitted anyway. Thus, the war could not be causal even though it correlated with the
presence of the symptoms. Lewis concluded his assessment of the situation in London
with this observation:
From all of this it follows that a severe neurosis hardly occurs as a war phenomenon except in
people who had been neurotic before the war; and that when neurosis develops or is aggravated
during the war, war stress had not been responsible for this in a quarter of the previously healthy,
and in a fifth of those with previous neurotic history.
80
78Lewis, op. cit., note 75 above, p. 175.
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The Origins of the Anglo-American Research AllianceLewis had adopted the explanation that most of the patients with neuroses would have
developed them anyway. That these symptoms appeared in the context of the war was
coincidental.
Lewis then addressed himself to the overall incidence of neurotic illness throughout
England. In this section, rather then relying on statistical data, Lewis utilized written
observations from physicians. A professor of medicine, three psychiatrists, and six general
practitioners in the bombed areas of Liverpool, Birkenhead and Wallasey reported that
there was no evidence of an increase in ‘‘psychoneuroses as a result of the war’’. A
physician in Rhyl admitted to seeing many heightened anxiety states but claimed,
‘‘they have all been in people who have not been bombed at all (anticipation neuroses)’’.
81
The physician added that the demeanour of injured persons was ‘‘patient and stoical’’.
Another physician remarked:
These patients ...were grateful for any attention and had a serenity and calm which might be due to
the fact that, having experienced their worst fears and come through, they were content to await the
future and not rush to meet it—no evidence here of neurosis either hysterical or depressive.
82
Lewisconcluded hisreportwithadiscussionandasummary.Inhisdiscussion,headmitted
causes of neuroses were almost impossible to identify, but it was clearto him that the terror
of air raids was less attributable than secondary factors like the loss of a home.
83 The
tremendous social upheaval that had happened in population centres like London meant
that many individuals had been displaced to unfamiliar areas of the country—their iso-
lation from family and friends might well have caused stresses.
Overall, it was impossible to argue that air raids had caused a ‘‘striking increase’’ in
neurotic illnesses. Crude figures suggested that the number of cases had diminished. Since
it was impossible to distinguish between neurotic illness attributable to air raids and that
resulting from secondary circumstances caused by air-raid disruption, it could not be
suggested that air raids in themselves were causal. Instead, Lewis concluded, ‘‘it is to
the war as a whole, with its accumulated stresses, that people have had to adjust them-
selves, and signs of failure to do this can be taken as warning signals of neurosis’’.
84
Lewis’s report is a challenging document to read, and it has curious inconsistencies.
Several times, for example, Lewis claimed an increase in patient numbers was due only to
changes in health care organization. Yet, when trends demonstrated a decrease in the
number of neurotics, the question of whether changes in health provision might have
influenced this decline was ignored. Because there is no other mental health survey
from the same years (1939–42), it is impossible to compare data in the report with
other information. Although there is no definitive evidence that it was propaganda, the
81One of the problems of interpreting this report
arises from the fact that some of the psychiatrists and
general physicians Lewis interviewed used the term
psychoneuroses, while others mentioned anticipation
neuroses,anxietyneuroses,anddepressiveneurosesin
their written testimonials. Lewis never clarified if
these terms were synonyms or whether they indicated
separate clinical entities. This problem of classifying
all types of air-raid casualties had been identified by
G B Shirlaw, ‘Classification of air-raid casualties’,
Lancet, 1940, ii: 344–5; it was also considered by
Blacker, op. cit., note 48 above, p. 47.
82Lewis, op. cit., note 75 above, p. 177.
83Lewis was aware of a ‘‘proposal’’ by Solly
Zuckerman to conduct research on the question of
links between civilian housing and morale. This was
then being considered by the Ministry of Home
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to Edward Mellanby, 14 Aug. 1941.
84Lewis, op. cit., note 75 above, p. 183.
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Stephen T Casperdocument possesses an undeniable aesthetic quality, especially in the testimonials about
the stoicism and courage of the civilians whose lives were ravaged by the bombardment.
Comments like that of a psychiatrist in Liverpool—‘‘all my patients and friends have stood
up to the raids much better than I expected’’—left traces of a community narrative of
struggle, fear, and perseverance, which would have resonated with readers in North
America. That ‘‘patients and friends’’ were represented together almost suggested a blur-
ring of the lines between physicians, patients, and friends—everyone was affected by the
blitz. Boundaries between the social and the professional had vanished within a narrative
of resistance, patriotism, and commitment to maintain the morale of the nation.
International ‘‘Facts’’ and the Production of ‘‘Fairly Reliable Data’’
Aubrey Lewis sent his report to Edward Mellanby in early August 1941, and Mellanby
forwarded it to Adrian, askingfor hisassessment.
85 Adrian was pleased: ‘‘Lewis’s report is
verygoodstuffandoughtcertainlytogotoWeed—asareportinwhichhispsychoneuroses
committee would be interested, and to [Wilder] Penfield in Canada.’’ He then pondered
whether there was any government committee that could look at the issue more closely:
‘‘The difficulty is that there are a lot of bodies already in the field—Child guidance, mental
health, psychologicalsociety,etc.,and aspecial committee would beno useatall.’’But, he
added, ‘‘if you could either make a special committee or call an occasional conference,
thoroughly unrepresentative ...I think we could then feel that we were not ignoring this
particular problem.’’
86
Mellanby eventually forwarded the report to the Americans.
87 Reminding Weed of the
circumstances that had initiated the document, he wrote that a special enquiry by Lewis,
‘‘one of our best psychiatrists’’, had now revealed the ‘‘real state of affairs’’—there was
little or no evidence of an increase in neuroses.
88 Weed replied a few weeks later:
It is an important statement which Dr Lewis makes, and I am sure that it will go far towards
clearing up the conception or misconception which the American psychiatrists have had regarding
the neuroses problem in England. We have had so many differing reports regarding this medical
question that an authoritative statement is most welcome.
89
Weed’s comments contain a tone of ambiguity.
90 True, Lewis’s report had revealed no
evidence of an increase in civilian neuroses, yet at best it had not addressed the question
fully. For the most part, and by Lewis’s own admission, the data and analysis did not
conclusively support any specific position. Whether Weed was aware of this or had simply
85NA,FD1/6580,letterfromEdwardMellanbyto
Edgar Adrian, 15 Aug. 1941.
86NA, FD 1/6580, letter from Edgar Adrian to
Edward Mellanby, 18 Aug. 1941.
87NA, FD 1/6580, letter from Wilson Jameson to
Landsborough Thomson, 4 Sept. 1941.
88NA,FD1/6580,letterfromEdwardMellanbyto
Lewis Weed, 2 Oct. 1941.
89NRC, MS: Allied Cooperation 1940–April
1941, letter from Lewis Weed to Edward Mellanby,
17 Oct. 1941.
90Weed was more aware of the psychiatric
research situation in Britain than Mellanby might
have suspected. In August 1941, O’Brien had sent
Weed the Maudsley Hospital’s ‘Report on Research’
to the Rockefeller Foundation, ‘‘through the channel
ofDr.[Pat]Cushing[nephewofHarveyCushing]who
isnowhere,asitcontainssomematerialonpsychiatry
in war-time that I thought might be of some use to the
N.R.C.’’ Letter from Daniel O’Brien to Alan Gregg,
25 July 1941, folder 258, box 19, series 401, RG 1.1,
RAC.
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or misconception’’, seems subtly sarcastic now. Even if the report was objective, there was
no reason why Weed or any American psychiatrist should treat it as more than political
propaganda. Still worse, they could have interpreted it as proof of their original allegation
that the British tended to minimize the problem.
91
Conclusion
TheCanadianWilder Penfield, anAnglophilewhovisitedBritainin1941, characterized
the problem of civilian neuroses in an essay titled ‘Clinical notes from a trip to Great
Britain’.
92 He wrote,
Not only is there no increase in psychoneuroses in the civil population, but there is an actual decrease
as compared with peace time. This is an established fact. It is part of the general national reaction of
quiet defiance that is immediately apparent, and thrilling, to a new arrival in Britain now.
93
Penfield’s remarks are interesting to contrast with another official explanation that
appeared ten years later:
Early in 1940 [admissions to mental hospitals] began to drop below normal, but this was at first
probably mainly due to the refusal of many local authorities to admit voluntary patients to their
already overcrowded hospitals. Incidentally, this illustrates the difficulty of measuring the true
incidence of mental disorder, since the admission rate is always liable to be affected by variations
in the accommodation available.
94
Both explanations appealed to different logics, relevant to time and context. Penfield’s
wartime remarks were one style of reaction to the crisis in Britain. His observation was
loaded with heroic and rhetorical imagery that spoke to the morale of a people who would
never give up. In contrast, the post-war explanation feels pragmatic, and oriented towards
unified national policy. Even as it confirmed the observation that the numbers of mentally
ill patients had decreased prior to the onset of the blitz, it offered a more prosaic inter-
pretation—available beds not numbers of patients had decreased and the organization of
hospitals had been disrupted by the conditions of war.
95 In correspondence found in the
91Later,themedicalpresswouldconfusetheissue
further. WL, GC/135/B/1 Box 2, Service Psychiatry
Monographs, extract from the British Medical
Journal, 1942, ii: 574–6: William Sargant, ‘Physical
treatment of acute war neuroses: some clinical
observations’.
92On Wilder Penfield, see Wilder Penfield, No
man alone: a neurosurgeon’s life, Boston, Little,
Brown, 1977.
93Wilder Penfield, ‘Clinical notes from a trip to
Great Britain’, Arch. Neurol. Psychiatry, 1942, 47:
p. 1034.
94My emphasis. Arthur Salusbury MacNalty
(ed.),The civilianhealth and medicalservices,2 vols,
London, HMSO, 1953–1955, vol. 1, p. 184.
95Furthersupportforthisviewappearsinwartime
sources. The Maudsley Hospital, for example, had
been re-located to Mill Hill and Sutton Emergency
Hospitals. They reported in early 1940 that Mill Hill
had 200 neuro-psychiatric beds, which were to be
filled by normal civilian cases, ‘‘acute psychiatric
casualties’’ resulting from air raids, psychiatric
disorder among the fighting forces, and cases with
effort syndrome and another psychiatric condition.
See Memorandum on the plan of work to be
undertaken at Mill Hill emergency hospital under
war conditions with special reference to research
investigations, 9 Feb. 1940, folder 257, box 19, series
401, RG 1.1, RAC. As late as 17 February 1941, R H
Curtis of the London County Council at Mill Hill,
could write: ‘‘I am afraid London just now is no place
to which to invite a friend, but I am glad you are
coming, all the same. I wish things were more nearly
normal. It is a horrid thought that the Maudsley is still
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Stephen T CasperRockefeller Archives from 1940 and 1941, John Rawlings Rees of the Tavistock Square
Clinic for the Treatment of Functional Nerve Cases affirmed that the work of his clinic had
decreasedduringtheblitzbecausemanypeoplewouldgonowhereafterdarkandmanyhad
left London.
96
Where Lewis’s report found sympathy and support in narratives like that of Penfield,
views like those of Rees were being circulated in other places, and suggested another
reason for the fall in neurotic patients. It would be wrong to claim that Lewis’s study was
propaganda—we will never know and it seems unlikely. These tensions nevertheless tell
us much about the influences of national security concerns on science and especially on
transnational science collaboration during periods of crisis. Several political realities
forcefully intersected in the origins and production of Lewis’s report. Firstly, there was
the devastating crisis of the war, and especially of the air raids, on the civilian population,
which threatened British national sovereignty. Secondly, the informal transatlantic colla-
boration in biomedical research blurred the concept of sovereign nation states by making
the boundaries of knowledge for combined defence transparent and open. Yet, in turn,
openness created special problems. There were, for example, inherent differences between
North American and British national styles of science and science organization. It was in
these differences between what might be loosely termed national schools of thought that
another political layer emerged. In Britain, as Shephard has argued, ‘‘psychiatric policy
towards civilians was being run by tough-minded veterans of the First World War, deter-
mined not in any way to encourage neurosis’’.
97 It was these tough-minded veterans who
antagonized professional interests in America, especially psychiatrists on the National
Research Council’s War Neuroses subcommittee.
98 At the same time, the Americans
seemingly failed to understand the pressure the British psychiatric, neurological, and
psychological authorities were under, especially those with military appointments and
empty and that its work is all disorganized, in spite of
the effort made—I think with a measure of success—
to keep its spirit and research alive at Mill Hill and
Sutton.’’LetterfromRHCurtintoDanielO’Brien,17
Feb. 1941, folder 258, box 19, series 401, RG 1.1,
RAC; Also in this folder, see the London County
Council‘Reportof air-raiddamage’,pp. 1-6, attached
to the Memorandum, Daniel O’Brien to Alan Gregg,
14 May 1941. This report finds that ‘‘Since 7
th
September 1940, 106 incidents have been reported
from the mental hospitals, 4 incidents having been
reportedfrom3mentalhospitalsandonedistrictoffice
from 18
th April to the evening of 1
st May 1941’’, p. 1.
On p. 6, the report indicates that 279 beds were
permanently removed from service because of enemy
action,951hadbeenremovedtemporarily,thateleven
hospitals had sustained serious damage, and a further
eleven had been slightly damaged. Included in these,
were Mill Hill and Sutton Emergency Hospitals. Mill
Hill had lost 40 beds, and 150 were temporarily
unusable. At Sutton, 4 beds were permanently
gone, and 91 temporarily. A comparable survey
for hospitals in the provinces has not been
located.
96Letter from John Rees to Alan Gregg, 2 Jan.
1941, folder 347 Tavistock Clinic, box 26, series 401,
RG 1.1, RAC; on Rees, seeMalcolmPines, ‘Rees, John
Rawlings, 1890–1969’, ODNB, vol. 46, pp. 323–4.
97Shephard, op. cit., note 35 above, p. 181.
98The attitude was common. Walter Maclay
(1902–1964), Medical Superintendent of the
Maudsley staff and a visitor for three months in the
United States in 1943, described his attitude thus: ‘‘In
war time the problem of the anti-social effect of
neurosis has come very much to the fore, whether the
society concerned in the fighting services or the
civilian community. In the last war this problem was
appreciated too late and neurosis was, on the whole,
considered as an excusing disability and the neurotic
was accepted as a pensionable burden negative to war
effort.Inthiswar,from theoutset,psychiatricmethod
and organization was directed against neurosis as an
excusing social disability: treatment was directed not
only towards the individual neurotic problems but
more towards social reinstatement.’’ Folder 259, box
19, series 401, RG 1.1, RAC. Such views make it
difficult to see how the ‘‘reported’’ incidence of
neuroses could have increased.
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morale of the nation, and the image of that morale, needed to convey a message to allies
and enemies alike: Britain would not fall; its citizens would never give up. Increases in
civilian neuroses would have posed a direct contradiction to that most important claim of
courage and fortitude. If a suicide like Virginia Woolf’s, as Adrian identified, could
become the propaganda of the enemy, then it could be conflated with an aura of defeatism
in the British public.
Lewis’s report wrestled with these tensions, but its conclusions ultimately reflected the
most optimistic picture. An editorial in The Times, citing Lewis’s work, commented,
It is said, for example, that those who live in dangerous times develop a more acute realization of
the value and virtue of life and that when life has an object in which interest and enthusiasm are
strongly enlisted the temptation to end it is discounted.
99
This image of resolve could not be tarnished. If it were a ‘‘truth’’ projected outward to
a hostile foe or for the benefit of friends and allies, then it was also a ‘‘truth’’ reflected
inwards. A truth intended to construct a rhetorical fortress that circumscribed a multi-
plicity of truths with the moral and political bricks and mortar of defiance, patriotism,
duty, and unequivocal courage.
By autumn 1941, science in Anglo-America was undergoing a massive transformation,
especially in the United States. It is clear that the executive order that established the
Office of Scientific and Research Development in the summer of 1941 was paving a road
towards the era of centralized government science. For the biomedical sciences in the
United States, one of the immediate results of the creation of the OSRD was the formation
of the Committee on Medical Research, an entity that effectively diminished the role of the
NRC. The transnational liaison initiated by the NRC, however, did not diminish in impor-
tance; and the people involved in it continued to work together on problems related to the
medical defence of Anglo-America. In hindsight, their informal liaisons were inextricable
from the informal networks in science and medicine that had characterized the earlier
progressive era, yet they were also indicating a way towards that new world of science
which emerged in the post-war period. This biomedical collaboration reveals the ways
those two separate historical worlds can be connected. In many respects, it was through the
small ingredients of informality and friendship that Anglo-American scientists constructed
and then accustomed themselves to a world of big laboratories and even bigger operating
budgets. This would become a world where national security considerations and the
production of scientific knowledge could not be disentangled.
100 The questions and
answers about the incidence of civilian neuroses in Britain during the Second World
War were small signs of a not too distant future.
99‘Fewer suicides’, The Times, 1 Sept. 1942, p. 5.
100Lyotard, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 10–47.
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